Abstract Climate-driven changes in precipitation distribution have implications for the long-term sustainability of international water-sharing and hydropower agreements. This research analyses water allocation methods, estimates the resilience of existing water supply arrangements, and examines the role of modified institutional arrangements in addressing possible vulnerabilities in transboundary basins. Specifically, we analyse the resilience of the 1994 Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace during climate extremes. While the absence of a drought provision in the Treaty left Jordan and Israel vulnerable to drought-induced conflict, the Treaty did establish a Joint Water Committee (JWC) to resolve conflicts without making permanent amendments to the original agreement. During the drought of 1998/99, Israeli and Jordanian members of the JWC brokered a temporary arrangement to modify allocations in order to reflect water availability. Even though water availability restricted the parties from fulfilling Treaty obligations, the institutional arrangement created by the Treaty enabled the parties to peacefully cooperate in time of severe drought.
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PRINCIPLES GUIDING WATER ALLOCATION
Water is the only scarce resource for which there is no substitute, over which there is poorly-developed international law, and the need for which is overwhelming, constant and immediate. Shared water resources provoke political tensions between Arabs and Israelis, Indians and Bangladeshis, Americans and Mexicans, and all ten riparian states of the Nile River. There are 274 confirmed international rivers, covering almost half of the total land surface of the globe and untold (TFDD, 2008) . As global populations continue to grow exponentially, and as climate change threatens the quantity and quality of natural resources, the ability of nations to peacefully resolve conflicts over internationally distributed water resources will increasingly be a factor in stable and secure international relations (Wolf, 1999 ).
An evaluation of indicators of international water conflict conducted by Yoffe et al. (2003) suggests that droughts and floods, as a single variable, are only weakly linked to water disputes. However, droughts and floods on international transboundary rivers, in the absence of socio-political agreements, create settings conducive to conflict. "The most promising sets of indicators for water conflict [are] those associated with rapid or extreme physical or institutional change within a basin (e.g. large dams or internationalization of a basin) and the key role of institutional mechanisms, such as freshwater treaties, in mitigating such conflict" (Yoffe et al., 2003 (Yoffe et al., , p.1109 . If water supply is not sufficient to fulfil treaty obligations and institutional arrangements are not resilient to changes in supply, then conflict may arise.
Resource conflicts will increase in frequency and intensity as water supplies become relatively scarcer and their use within nations can no longer be insulated from cross-border impacts. It has been suggested that more conscious attention to the art and science of negotiation, mediation, and arbitration can provide useful insights for resolving these conflicts without recourse to the limited solutions possible in international courts of law or, worse, the devastating possibility of armed conflict (Wolf, 1999) .
Water allocations as geographical issues
A central issue of international water quantity disputes is the lack of internationally accepted criteria for allocating shared water resources or their benefits. This is true despite the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (hereafter referred to as the 1997 Convention), whose guidelines do not offer the specificity necessary for unequivocal allocations. Although usually explored within the realms of law or economics, the questions considered are inherently geographical (Karan, 1961) : "Can one generalize a code of conduct for locations (watersheds) , which are by nature hydrologically, politically, and culturally unique?" (White, 1957) . How does one develop guidelines for allocating a vital, fugitive resource that is mobile, fluctuates in time and in space, and disregards political boundaries?
Institutional arrangements
Equitable distribution of water resources is at the heart of water conflict management. A vague and relative term in any event, equitable criteria are particularly difficult to determine in water conflicts, where international water law is ambiguous and often contradictory, and no mechanism exists to enforce negotiated principles. However, application of an equitable water-sharing agreement along volatile waterways is a prerequisite to hydro-political stability, which, finally, could help propel political forces away from conflict in favour of cooperation (Wolf, 1999) .
International principles Customary international law focuses on providing general guidelines for the watersheds of the world. In the absence of such guidelines, some principles have been claimed regularly by riparian states in negotiations, often depending on relative position in the watershed. Many of the common claims for water rights are based either on hydrography, (i.e. from where a river or an aquifer originates and how much of that territory falls within a certain state) or on chronology (i.e. who has been appropriating the water the longest).
Initial positions are usually extreme (Matthews, 1984; Housen-Couriel, 1994) . The "doctrine of absolute sovereignty" is often claimed by an upstream riparian. This principle, referred to as the Harmon Doctrine, after the US Attorney General who suggested this stance in 1895 regarding a dispute with Mexico over the Rio Grande, argues that a state has absolute rights to water flowing through its territory (LeMarquand, 1976) . Considering that this doctrine was immediately rejected by Harmon's successor and later officially repudiated by the USA (McCaffery, 1996) , was never implemented in any water treaty (with the rare exception of some internal tributaries of international waters), was not invoked as a source for judgment in any international water legal ruling, and was explicitly rejected by an international tribunal in 1957, the Harmon Doctrine is wildly overemphasized as a principle of international law (Wolf, 1999) .
The downstream extreme claim often depends on climate. In a humid watershed, the extreme principle advanced is the doctrine of absolute riverain integrity, which suggests that every riparian is entitled to the natural flow of a river system crossing its borders. This principle has reached acceptance in the international setting as rarely as absolute sovereignty. In an arid or exotic (humid headwater region with an arid downstream) watershed, the downstream riparian often has established water infrastructure to defend. The principle that rights are acquired through past use is referred to as "historic right" (or "prior appropriation" in the USA), that is, "first in time, first in right" (Wolf, 1999) .
These conflicting doctrines of hydrography and chronology clash along many international rivers, with positions usually defined by relative riparian positions. Downstream riparians, such as Iraq and Egypt, often receive less rainfall than their upstream neighbours and, therefore, have depended on freshwater diversions for much longer historically. As a consequence, modern "rights-based" disputes often take the form of upstream riparians, such as Ethiopia and Turkey, arguing in favour of the doctrine of absolute sovereignty, with downstream riparians taking the position of historic rights. For examples of these respective positions, see the exchange between Jovanovic (1985) and Shahin (1989) in the respective issues of Water International about the Nile and the descriptions of political claims along the Euphrates in Kolars & Mitchell (1991) .
Several principles of international water law are useful in providing guidance in water sharing agreements. Such principles are the moderates of equitable and reasonable use, the obligation to not cause harm, the protection of prior uses, and the prioritization of uses. Upstream riparians tend to favour the principle of equitable and reasonable use, as it incorporates multiple factors when negotiating hydraulic development and, thus, provides flexibility for utilization of waters that may impact downstream users. Arguably, both the Helsinki Rules and the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses share this principle as their foundation (Dellapenna, 1995; Salman, 2007) . In practice, no treaties use the parameters defined in these documents to allocate water. Both the 1975 Mekong Agreement and the 1990 Niger Agreement have similar lists that set up a framework by which to determine which uses are legitimate, but neither of these treaties actually derives allocations.
The obligation to not cause harm requires riparians to take all appropriate actions to prevent causing significant harm to other riparians. Often, this is misinterpreted as the upstream not causing harm to the downstream, but harm does not only flow downstream. Downstream riparians are capable of causing significant harm to upstream users in the form of development prevention. In other words, if a downstream riparian develops a hydraulic project, upstream riparians are then prevented from utilizing upstream waters if that use may impact the downstream project (Salman, 2007) .
While not used specifically in any treaty allocation derivations, both the Helsinki Rules and the International Law Commission's Draft Rules on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses list hydrographic and socio-political factors that should be taken into account when prioritizing the use of shared water resources. The 1975 Mekong Agreement and the 1990 Niger Agreement list these factors and circumstances nearly verbatim. Priority is typically given to vital human needs with descending weight based on cost-benefit ratio, consumption or pollution. For example, in the 1997 Complementary Settlement on the Cuareim River between Brazil and Uruguay, potable water for riparian populations is given the highest priority before allocations for irrigation are arranged. Similarly, the 1909 treaty over the USA-Canadian boundary waters exempts domestic and sanitary needs from allocation restrictions and lays out a priority based on consumption, navigation, hydropower, and irrigation.
Principles in practice It quickly becomes clear in negotiation that keeping to an extreme position leaves very little room for bargaining. Over time, claims become moderated, such that most states eventually accept some limitation both to their own sovereignty and to the river's absolute integrity. The doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty reflects rights to reasonable and equitable use of the waters of an international waterway, yet with the acknowledgment that one should not cause significant harm to any other riparian state (Wolf, 1999) . In fact, the relationship between reasonable and equitable use and the obligation to not cause significant harm is the more-subtle manifestation of the argument between hydrography and chronology.
The practice of allocating transboundary water resources is revealed in the treaties negotiated between co-riparian states. Approximately 117 treaties with water-sharing components have been negotiated since 1874. These water allocation treaties generally come about in conjunction with boundary waters agreements, river development agreements, and/or single-project agreements (TFDD, 2008) .
What is noticeable in reading through the practice of water conflict resolution, as documented in these 117 treaties, is just how rarely the general principles are explicitly invoked, particularly the extreme principles of absolute sovereignty or absolute riverain integrity. Many of the treaties simply divide water equally between riparians, some divide the benefits, such as hydropower, derived from the waters equally. Most favour existing uses and/or guarantees to downstream riparians; the upstream riparian is favoured only rarely. One interesting pattern emerges: while many international water negotiations begin with differing legal interpretations of rights, whether measured by hydrography or chronology, they often shift rather to needs-based criteria for water allocations, as measured by some mutually agreeable parameter, such as irrigable land or population. Mostly, one is struck by the creativity of the negotiators in addressing specific language to each very specific local setting and concerns. Rather than building from the legal principles, technocrats generally enlist lawyers late in the process to help codify water management practices, based primarily on the hydro-political landscape (Wolf, 1999) .
One might speculate as to why negotiations move from rights-based to needs-based criteria for allocation. The first reason may concern the psychology of negotiations. Rothman (1995) , among others, points out that negotiations ideally move through three stages: the adversarial stage, in which each side defines its positions or rights; the reflexive stage, where underlying needs are addressed; and, finally, to the integrative stage, where negotiators brainstorm together to address each side's underlying interests. Water allocation negotiations follow this pattern from rights to needs and, occasionally, to interests. Where each negotiator may self-identify as Egyptian, Israeli or Indian, and the rights of one's own country are paramount, one must, over time, empathize, to some degree, and realize that even one's political enemy, Sudanese, Palestinian or Pakistani, requires the same amount of water for the same uses as one's own people (Wolf, 1999) .
The second reason for the shift from rights to needs may simply be that rights are not as easily quantifiable as needs. The 1997 Convention provides vague guidance for allocations-a series of occasionally conflicting parameters to be considered as a whole. If two nations insist on their respective rights of upstream versus down, for example, there is no spectrum along which to bargain; no common frame of reference. One can much more readily determine a needs-based criterion, such as irrigable land or population, and quantify each nation's needs. Even with differing interpretations, once both sides feel comfortable that their minimum quantitative needs are being met, talks eventually turn to straightforward bargaining over numbers along a common spectrum (Wolf, 1999) .
In contrast to the extreme rarity with which absolute principles are codified, prior uses are regularly protected. Many treaties focus entirely on protecting existing uses. All of the six existing treaties regarding the Nile, for example, protect Egyptian uses in early years, and later those of Egypt and Sudan. More often, a clause to protect the existing uses is included in a broad treaty, whether the focus is boundary demarcations, boundary waters, or water resources development. Peru continues to supply water to Ecuadorian villages, for example, as part of a 1944 boundary demarcation. The boundary water accords between the USA and Canada and between the USA and Mexico, all include prior use clauses. A 1969 accord between Portugal, for Angola, and South Africa, for Southwest Africa, which describes an elaborate river development project, includes humanitarian allocations for human and animal requirements in Southwest Africa (Wolf, 1999) .
Again, we might speculate on the inherent supremacy of prior uses. First, we have noted the shift in thinking from rights to needs; existing water use is a defensible expression of needs. Second, treaties with clauses for water allocations generally come about in conjunction with boundary delineation, division of boundary waters, or agreement over future river development. In each of these cases, water users are important constituents of the negotiators. In cases regarding boundary waters, negotiations are carried out in the political arena where the support of those living within a watershed would be vital to an accord's success. In the case of river development, the technocrats who negotiate these treaties, usually from water agencies, are generally acutely aware of in-basin needs. In all cases, existing uses represent existing constituents, in contrast to hypothetical users or future generations-groups whose influence is particularly difficult to enlist (Wolf, 1999) .
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS THAT INFLUENCE RESILIENCE
Because most treaties base allocations on historical and existing uses, they are particularly vulnerable to future changes in water availability. Lack of flexibility in treaties compounds this problem. While riparians share their water based on historical use, they may neglect to consider future climate scenarios. However, treaties are composed of multiple articles and many, while determining allocations based on history, include provisions that look to the future. Such foresight includes provisions for extreme events (floods and/or droughts), allocations with built-in flexibilities that reflect availability, and conflict resolution mechanisms.
As the Earth's climate varies, water availability is expected to be impacted by changes in the global water cycle. Projecting water availability models at the basin scale is complex and less certain than temperature models and regional models. Regional models "project 10-40% increases in runoff in eastern equatorial Africa, the La Plata basin and high-latitude North America and Eurasia, and 10-30% decreases in runoff in southern Africa, southern Europe, the Middle East and mid-latitude western North America by the year 2050" (Milly et al., 2005, p. 347) . At the basin scale, all we can be certain of is the need for resilience to manage variability. Therefore, watersharing arrangements must be flexible in these uncertain times to deal with fluctuations in availability that are difficult to quantify.
Extreme events provisions
In an analysis of institutional capacity to manage transboundary floods, Bakker (2007, p. 107) identified only 24 treaties out of 269 international waterrelated treaties that contain flood-related components. These treaties are concentrated in 11 highlydeveloped basins. The research also reveals that when floods occur in transboundary basins, death and displacement tolls are lower in basins that have established institutional capacity relative to those basins without institutional capacity. As our climate changes to one of more extremes and great floods are predicted to increase across Canada, Alaska, northern Europe and northern Asia (Milly et al., 2002) , negotiation of transboundary water-related treaties to include flood provisions can literally save lives.
Mechanisms to deal with water shortage are even more influential for regional vulnerability to conflict because of the extended temporal nature of drought and the economic, political, and ecological toll that prolonged water stress can take on riparians. Examples include conservation strategies, reductions in diversions and deliveries to reflect availability, and technofixes, such as increased desalination and groundwater harvesting. In lieu of explicit drought provisions, some water-sharing agreements factor in availability when calculating allocations. In times of drought, equitable arrangements share the burden across the treaty basin.
Flexible allocations that reflect availability
The mechanism for allocating water between countries, as laid out in treaties, is essential to determining resilience. Rigid volumetric arrangements (e.g. country X gets 123 × 10 3 m 3 ) leave no room to mitigate water availability fluctuation. Arrangements based on percentages (e.g. country X gets 50%) are flexible to changes in availability yet pose a different set of obstacles in their implementation, because each country must agree on how much water is present before it can be split. Temporal aspects reflect the needs of countries as the seasons change (e.g. country X is entitled to water in the growing season, as is the case in the 1998 Aral Sea Treaty) or as a mechanism to manage availability (e.g. country X is entitled to a certain 10-year average volume of water, as is the case between the USA and Mexico on the Rio Grande).
An example of a complex allocation calculus is the arrangement to share the Incomati River in southern Africa. South Africa and Swaziland agree to share water in terms of assurances using a unique formula, giving each state a certain amount (South Africa: 157.8 hm 3 , Swaziland: 15.1 hm 3 ) at high assurance-2% risk in any one year of only partial availability-and another amount (South Africa: 381 hm 3 , Swaziland: 260.2 hm 3 ) at low assurance-total unavailability for up to 20% of the time, on average, in respect of 30% and a 2% risk in any one year of only partial availability in respect of the remaining 70%. Losses to evaporation are counted. In variable years, the ratio of the flows remains the same. A country may convert its allocations from low-assuranceto high-assurance-flow, or vice versa, at a conversion rate of 0.794, subject to approval. Such a scheme reflects availability of water with respect to time and is less likely to result in conflict due to unanticipated variation.
In the 1996 Ganges River Treaty between India and Bangladesh, a calculus of volumes, percentages and availability was agreed upon such that: during low flows at Farakka Barrage (dam), India and Bangladesh split the flow evenly; at midrange flows Bangladesh is entitled to a fixed volume while India gets the balance; and at high flows India is entitled to a fixed volume while Bangladesh gets the balance. Such a scheme seems resilient to drought because difficult times are shared equally, and it provides riparians with assurances of entitlements during average-flow and high-flow years. However, in the years following the agreement, India and Bangladesh disputed the flow level despite the fact that it is spelled out explicitly in the treaty, i.e. low flow means 70 000 'cusecs' (1982 m 3 s -1 ) or less; moderate flow means 70 000-75 000 'cusecs' (1982-2124 m 3 s -1 ); high flow means 75 000 'cusecs' (2124 m 3 s -1 ) or more. The treaty does not prescribe actions in the event of a dispute over flow levels; so the parties are unable to quickly resolve a conflict that continues to fester (Roy, 1997) . This example illustrates the importance of conflictresolution mechanisms even when agreements seem to have resilient water allocation methods.
Conflict resolution mechanisms
When conflicts flare, whether due to climate variability, water availability, technical uncertainties, or interpretation of ambiguous treaty language, the resilience of an institutional arrangement is tested. Riparians agree to resolve water-related conflicts via multiple avenues. The United Nations council, international tribunals, neutral third party mediation, joint water committees, and presidential consultation are common forms of conflict-resolution mechanisms established in treaty negotiations to ensure that disputes are resolved in accordance with the intentions of the parties. Joint water management committees, while not explicitly stated in the treaty that establishes them, may also hold the power to resolve conflicts by their nature as a governing agency over the water body. However, some joint commissions, for example, the Mekong River Commission, are outright banned from directly resolving conflict.
JORDAN RIVER BASIN DISCUSSION

Method of analysis
To assess where a treaty lies on a resilience-tovulnerability continuum, we use the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) of International Freshwater Treaties. The TFDD provides a wealth of empirical information and analysis of physical, social, economic, and political variables, the implications of these variables at different spatial and temporal scales and linkages across scales. In addition, it provides comprehensive data sets of international water conflict and cooperation events.
Econometric models are developed for the Israeli-Jordanian institutional arrangement to estimate likely failure of water allocation arrangements. Inputs to the models include:
-conflict resolution mechanisms; -allocation methods (e.g. formulas, joint management, benefit distribution); -drought and flood provisions; and -the role of institutional arrangements in mitigating past failure.
For the Jordan Basin, event data from the TFDD are used to determine when treaty obligations were or were not fulfilled and when there was public comment, both positive and negative, concerning parameters of a treaty. The Basins at Risk (BAR) scale is used to characterize where the event falls on the conflict-to-cooperation continuum: positive 7 describes country unification; negative 7 describes war. Events that result in no action, and are categorized as verbal expressions to the media, receive a BAR rating of positive 1 (if a positive statement) or negative 1 (if a negative statement). This methodology is described in detail in Yoffe et al. (2003) . Event data are then plotted against climate information from the Israeli Meteorological Service to visualize relationship trends between cooperation, conflict and climatic extremes.
Allocation negotiations
In what will, no doubt, become a classic modification of the tenets of international law, Israelis and Jordanians invented legal terminology to suit particularly local requirements in their 1994 peace treaty. In negotiations leading up to the Treaty, Israelis, arguing that the entire region was running out of water, insisted on discussing only water allocations, that is, the future needs of each riparian. Jordanians, in contrast, refused to discuss the future until past grievances had been addressed-they would not negotiate allocations until the historic question of water rights were resolved (Wolf, 1999) .
There is little room to bargain between the past and the future, between rights and allocations. Negotiations reached an impasse until one of the mediators suggested the term "rightful allocations" to describe simultaneously historic claims and future goals for cooperative projects. This new term is now immortalized in the water-related clauses of the Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace (Wolf, 1999) .
The negotiated "rightful allocations" are fixed, conditional quantities that differ with the time of year. Availability is not a consideration except that Israel is entitled to water only if it allows for temporary, annual storage of Jordanian water in the Sea of Galilee (i.e. Lake Tiberias/Kinneret). Jordan is entitled to store 20 hm 3 of winter flows in Israeli reservoirs for release of those waters in the summer months. In return, Israel is entitled to 12 hm 3 in summer and 13 hm 3 in winter. If quantity is limited to the point that Israel cannot release the stored water, Israel may lose its entitlement. This scenario is not explicitly addressed in the document and has spurred conflict in the past (Medzini & Wolf, 2004) .
For the purpose of implementing the peace treaty, the Joint Water Committee (JWC) of three representatives from each country was established. Under Article VII.2 and 3, the JWC has freedom to define its scope of work, meeting frequency, and work procedures subject to the approval of the respective governments. While the treaty focuses on technological tasks for the JWC to supervise and carry out, such as developing new sources of supply and increasing efficiency, the JWC is the only joint institution mentioned in the treaty and has been relied upon in the past to fill the void of absence of drought provisions and conflict resolution mechanisms.
In the year after the 1994 Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan came into force, an Israeli water official voiced concern over the lack of a drought provision in the treaty. However, the treaty was not amended, and remains without an explicit contingency plan. Although, in Article 6.3, both parties "recognize that their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs", they neglected to include provisions to manage a climate-induced reduction in water availability. The parties were not oblivious to their needs and the water stress their countries face, and outlined how they are to cooperate to increase storage capacity and transfer efficiency in Jordan (Articles 11.1 and 11.2) even by means of transboundary water transfers. Though they agreed to search for ways in which to alleviate water shortages (Article 6.1.c.), they failed to agree on measures that would relieve political stress in times of increased water stress, nor did they address consequences for failing to adhere to negotiated deliveries.
The Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace falls into the minority of treaties that lack an explicit conflictresolution mechanism to arbitrate disputes concerning implementation of the treaty (Hamner & Wolf, 1998) . While not explicitly granted such powers, the JWC, in practice, has fulfilled this role in past conflicts. This framework may leave the arrangement vulnerable, should a party ever question the authority of the JWC. Moreover, power relations invariably play out in such relationships and leave the entity susceptible to potential coercion. Mark Zeitoun and colleagues have led the development of the theory of "hydro-hegemony" to track power as it plays out in water arrangements (see, for example, Zeitoun & Warner (2006) and Zeitoun & Mirumachi (2008) ). However, Jagerskog (2005) notes that Jordanians and Israelis have a long history of cooperating over water even if forced into secrecy in times of war. A relationship of trust has been formed and continues to flourish in the JWC.
Conflict and cooperation
In the Jordan Basin, the magnitude and frequency of conflict increase during periods of drought. During the drought of 1998-99, Israeli and Jordanian members of the JWC brokered a temporary arrangement to modify allocations to reflect water availability, thus resolving the conflict. Water shortages kept Israel from meeting its treaty obligations, spurring protests in Amman, furious public statements from the King of Jordan, and threatening the stability of the region (Medzini & Wolf, 2004) . While the absence of a drought provision in the Treaty of 1994 left Jordan and Israel vulnerable to conflict, the treaty did establish the JWC to resolve conflicts without making permanent amendments to the original agreement.
Even though water availability restricted the parties from fulfilling treaty obligations, the institutional arrangement created by the treaty enabled the parties to peacefully cooperate in time of severe drought. This study provides valuable insight into the importance of resilient social institutions in adaptation to climate change.
CONCLUSION
The potential impact of climate change on waterrelated, international, institutional arrangements further complicates water conflict scenarios. Watersharing arrangements vary in their resilience to change in water availability. Strict formulas for allocating water (e.g. country X gets 123 hm 3 ) tend to be more vulnerable than flexible allocation mechanisms (e.g. country X gets 50%) that may factor in availability and time of year. In times of severe water shortage or flood, rigid hydropower and water-sharing agreements may increase the potential for conflict when compared to agreements that have resilient components, such as conflict-resolution mechanisms and drought and flood provisions.
The Israeli-Jordanian conflicts that occurred during the 1998/99 drought support the idea that climate variability on international transboundary rivers in the absence of robust socio-political agreements creates a setting conducive to conflict. Negotiators of future institutional arrangements should heed the warning of this event-looking to the past alone will not prevent hydro-conflict-and consider the scientific unknown to create water-sharing agreements resilient to future climate scenarios.
